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This thesis evaluates the history of the Civil Defense programs from World War 
II through the Kennedy Administration. There were various government agencies tasked 
with Civil Defense, preparing the civilian department for war activities. The urban, 
suburban, and rural populations received different messages from these various agencies. 
There were specific marketing campaigns aimed at the rural and agricultural groups to 
convince them to prepare to survive a nuclear attack. The government needed this key 
demographic to survive and continue to provide food to the survivors of any nuclear 
attack. Rural populations and agricultural producers were important due to their ability to 
provide the crucial food supply necessary to the surviving populace. Without a reliable 
and safe food supply, the remaining people would not be able to rebuild all that had been 
destroyed during the nuclear attack. In addition, the rural population needed to survive to 
play host to those who survived the initial nuclear attacks. Survival plans for urban and 
suburban populations focused on separate messages than those for rural and agricultural 
areas because the latter had to factor livestock and crop protection into their survival 
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This paper will examine the buildup of the Civil Defense program between 1950 
and 1965. This time period is significant because it immediately follows the Soviet 
Union’s successful detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949 and the stockpile of nuclear 
weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union began growing. In addition, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October of 1962, a crucial time in world history. This 
was arguably the most active period in the history of the Civil Defense program. The 
general public faced a growing awareness that a worldwide nuclear war was ever more 
possible.   
One particular segment of the United States’ population was specifically targeted 
by the federal government. The government wanted to ensure that the rural population 
survived for several reasons. First, rural populations and agricultural producers provided 
food for the rest of the population. An adequate and safe food supply would be necessary 
for any survivors of a nuclear attack. Another reason to help the rural population prepare 
for an attack is that the vast majority of rural areas would experience little direct damage 
from a nuclear attack. This meant that rural areas of the country would be required to 
play host to those who survived the initial assault. Urban areas and military 
establishments were primary targets in every planning scenario. Any survivors of attacks 
would need to be evacuated to areas that experienced little damage, rural areas.  
The United States Civil Defense Program first began during World War II when 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941. Its name 





questioned until the Soviet Union detonated its own nuclear bomb in 1949, thereby 
eliminating the United States’ monopoly on this dangerous weapon. Fearful Americans 
demanded that their government help them plan for this new threat. Harry S. Truman’s 
administration created the Federal Civil Defense Administration in 1950, in response to 
local and state governments’ demands for help from the federal government to face the 
possibility of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. 
Traditionally, American citizens, unlike their European counterparts, had 
supported military efforts from a safe distance. During both World War I and World War 
II Americans had grown Victory Gardens, gathered scrap metal, and lived with ration 
booklets that controlled how much sugar, butter, gasoline, and countless other products 
they could buy, all to help win the war and keep it from advancing to our shores. 
However, when President Truman deliberately targeted Japanese civilians with the two 
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, the rules of war 
changed forever. The introduction of this ferocious weapon into the world’s arsenal 
drastically altered the way future conflicts were viewed. From this point on, civilians 
would find themselves directly in the crosshairs of all manner of destructive weapons and 
countries planned accordingly.  
The Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) was a subsection of the Office of 
Emergency Planning created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on May 20, 1941. This 
transitioned into the National Security Resource Board (NSRB) following World War II. 
The NSRB published informational material aimed at helping local governments with 
civil defense training. Most of their publications were ineffectual and local officials 





die.”1 In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its own atomic bomb and the United States 
government realized it was no longer alone in the nuclear club. In 1950, the NSRB 
became the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) when President Harry Truman 
signed the Federal Civil Defense Act. The FCDA continued providing government 
sponsored material to reassure the general population that even though the United States’ 
sworn enemy now had nuclear capabilities, it was all going to be fine. For instance, in 
Survival under Atomic Attack citizens are reassured that “There is one important thing 
you can do to lessen your chances of injury by blast: Fall flat on your face.”2 The 
information provided to the general public offered little scientific or technical 
information. The advice to fall flat preceded the claim that more than half the injuries of a 
nuclear bomb explosion are due to being thrown around or being hit by flying objects. 
The FCDA was responsible for civil defense preparations in the United States and its 
territories for the decade spanning from January 1951 through June 1961. President John 
F. Kennedy engaged in a game of chicken with Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev and 
Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro during the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962, 
and in doing so brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war. Prior to that, President 
Kennedy transferred the duties of the FCDA to the Department of Defense in 1961. He 
“issued an Executive Order which assigned major civil defense responsibilities to the 
Secretary of Defense.”3 This led to the creation of the Office of Civil Defense headed by 
an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense). 
                                                          
1 Kenneth Rose, One Nation Underground (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 23.  
  
2 U.S. Department of Defense Office of Civil Defense, Survival under Atomic Attack, Film. (1951; 







Throughout its various incarnations, the office responsible for Civil Defense 
preparations in the civilian population continued to produce pamphlets, films, coloring 
books, and newspaper serials aimed at convincing the American population that a nuclear 
war was survivable and winnable. While some of this material was general in nature, 
much was targeted to a specific audience. There were three major demographics targeted 
by the program materials, notably the urban population, the suburban population, and the 
rural or agricultural population. There were subsets of the larger groups targeted, for 
instance women and children. However, the main groupings were by locations because 
urban women would prepare differently than agricultural women would. 
There has been a significant amount of study done on the subject of Civil Defense 
and its many facets. This era is of particular interest to those who grew up in the shadow 
of the mushroom cloud. However, there has been little research done on the rural aspect 
of Civil Defense. There was a proliferation of academic articles and books published 
about all things atomic around the time that the children of the fifties and sixties reached 
the appropriate age to launch their independent research. Jo Anne Brown looked at civil 
defense in the public school systems in her 1988 study. She found that overwhelmingly 
children were first taught about nuclear war and survival in the classroom and then took 
that knowledge home to their parents.4 Elaine Tyler May5 and Susan Stoudinger 
Northcutt6 examined Civil Defense and gender in 1988 and 1999 respectively. They both 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 U.S. Department of Defense Office of Civil Defense, Personal and Family Survival (Washington 
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 8-9.  
 
4 JoAnne Brown, “A Is for Atom, B is for Bomb: Civil Defense in American Public Education, 
1948-1963,” The Journal of American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 68-90.   
 
5 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic 






analyzed the introduction of a war mentality into the traditionally domestic safe zone of 
the home. They determined that the United States government recruited women to help 
with preparedness efforts. The government knew that for the civilian population to have 
any hope of survival in large numbers, the women needed to be involved. An effort was 
made to convince women that unless they prepared their families to survive a nuclear 
attack, they were not doing their jobs as efficient caretakers. Neither author specifically 
discussed any issues specific to rural women, Tyler May does have a paragraph in her 
book about the increase in demand for rural real estate as a result of fears that urban 
centers will be bombed. Kristina Zarlengo studied the transformation of civilians from 
bystanders to targets. Her article claimed that the United States changed the rules of 
engagement when it dropped the two atomic bombs on Japanese civilian centers, thereby 
placing United States civilians directly in the sights of future opponents.7 Kenneth Rose 
studied the fallout shelter and the culture that surrounded that phenomenon.8 Tom 
Vanderbilt’s book Survival City: Adventures among the Ruins of Atomic America looked 
at, among other things, fallout shelters as well; including one that doubled as an 
elementary school in Artesia, New Mexico. Located in a small, rural, town south of 
Roswell, it was the only elementary school that contained a fully functioning morgue.9 
When evaluating the effect of fallout shelters on American society, it is tempting to think 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 Susan Stoudinger Northcutt, “Women and the Bomb: Domestication of the Atomic Bomb in the 
United States,” International Social Science Review 74, no. ¾ (1999): 129-139.   
 
7 Kristine Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women,” 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 24, no. 4 (1999) :925-958.  
 
8 Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture (New 
York: New York University Press, 2001).   
 
9 Tom Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America (New York: 





that all of America is riddled with backyard shelters. However, using Illinois’ Cook 
County, the county that houses Chicago as an example, as of November 19, 1961 “only 
19 people out of a population of 3,500,000 had applied for a permit to build a home 
shelter.”10  
Edward Zuckerman’s book contained detailed accounts of the continuity of 
business plans of several large corporations and their blueprints for how to get their 
company back up and running after a nuclear attack on the United States. Many of these 
companies kept a backup of all their important corporate records in a safe and secure 
location underground, usually a former salt mine in the region near their corporate 
headquarters.11 The Defense Production Act in 1950 established the importance of 
creating plans to protect key businesses in case of nuclear attack. Companies, especially 
in communication, manufacturing, and energy production, were encouraged by the 
FCDA to have “continuity of business” plans. These plans contained information of the 
line of succession, the list of people that had the legal power to run the company in the 
event key executives were killed in a nuclear attack. Much like the “continuity plan” for 
the Federal government, these plans took the guesswork out of disaster planning. 
Standard Oil went as far as providing sixteen emergency shelters around the New York 
area, stocked with preissued $25 and $100 checks to help them meet payroll following an 
attack.12 The business community was another specialized group targeted by the FCDA. 
The communication, manufacturing, and energy production businesses would play 
                                                          
 
10 Walter Karp, “When Bunkers Last in the Backyard Bloom’d,” American Heritage, 31 (1980): 
93.   
 
11 Edward Zuckerman, The Day after World War III (New York: The Viking Press, 1984).  





significant roles in the rebuilding of America following a nuclear attack and as such 
efforts should be made to protect them.  
Laura McEnaney suggested that the government’s Civil Defense office marketed 
its agenda primarily to suburban homeowners who were largely white.13 This may have 
been true with popular media like Life magazine and Popular Science. However, the 
suburban homeowner was not the only sector targeted. If you look beyond mass media 
and survival information provided through the post office to all postal customers, you 
find a significant amount of information specifically for the agricultural community. The 
government needed this key demographic to survive and continue to provide food to the 
survivors of any nuclear attack. The government, through various federal agencies, 
designed specific marketing campaigns aimed at the rural and agricultural groups to 
convince them to prepare to survive a nuclear attack. Rural populations and agricultural 
producers were important due to their ability to provide the crucial food supply necessary 
to the surviving populace. Without a reliable and safe food supply, the remaining people 
would not be able to rebuild all that had been destroyed during the nuclear attack. 
The authors listed above comprise a very small number of those that have written 
on the subject of Civil Defense in the United States.14 A wide range of subcategories 
within the subject of Civil Defense have been examined. However, the Civil Defense 
programs aimed at the rural and agricultural populations have been virtually ignored. 
This paper attempts to rectify the gap in the historiography of this subject.    
                                                          
 
13 Laura McEnanaey, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the 
Fifties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
 






This thesis will examine numerous ways that Civil Defense officials aggressively 
targeted the agricultural and rural population. The country needed this population, the 
knowledge they held, and the products that they provided. The government did use some 
different tactics to reach the rural and agricultural populations; they distributed pamphlets 
through local extension agents and created fallout shelter plans that incorporated barns 
for livestock. However, some of the avenues pursued were very similar, popular media 
was one tool used to reach audiences. For the general population, Civil Defense officials 
published information in Life magazine and Good Housekeeping; for the rural and 
agricultural population, they chose Successful Farming and and regional publications like 
Nebraska Farmer to carry the necessary information to their target audience. When the 
Office of Civil Defense commissioned public service announcements (PSA), they had 
some directed toward urban and suburban populations: Duck and Cover and Family 
Fallout Shelters. They also made one expressly for the rural and agricultural population: 
Your Livestock Can Survive Fallout from Nuclear Attack. The latter was available as a 
pamphlet as was Defense Against Radioactive Fallout on the Farm. While it may seem, 
from a cursory examination of popular media, that all the Civil Defense efforts were 
focused on the suburban middle class, a closer examination of material from the time 
period yields a different view of the situation. The government exerted a significant 
amount of energy trying to prepare the rural and agricultural populations to survive a 
nuclear attack; the government used different venues to reach different populations. 
There were some items produced by the Office of Civil Defense that were mass marketed 
to the general population. However, other items were strategically targeted toward the 





CIVIL DEFENSE FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH THE KENNEDY 
ADMINISTRATION 
The concept of civilian defense began to surface during the first World War. 
German forces bombed villages and towns in Poland, Belgium, France, and England in 
an attempt to defeat the Allies. These attacks did not extract a high death toll but did have 
a devastating psychological effect on the civilian population. With no organized civilian 
defense efforts, it was every person for themselves. Many in London sought out the 
subway tunnels underneath their city for a safe hiding place. While the German bombers 
dropped bombs on major cities throughout England, the major target was London. The 
total civilian dead from the bombings reached forty thousand; twenty thousand of those 
came from London.1 Because the conflict was contained in Europe, Americans felt safe 
from an attack on their homeland during World War I and therefore did not initially put 
any efforts into preparing the civilian population. Eventually the United States 
government moved to address the issue of the war as it affected their country. Created in 
1916, the Council of National Defense (CND) worked to garner support for the war 
effort. The Council included many members of the President’s cabinet, including the 
Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, War, and Navy. When the United 
States entered the war, Americans no longer felt as secure as they once had. Germany 
was waging unrestricted submarine warfare throughout the Atlantic, increasing fears of 
an attack on the Eastern seaboard. In addition, Germany tried to entice Mexico into 
attacking the United States, raising fears of an invasion from the south. With increased 
threats, the Council’s efforts increased and states were asked to form their own councils 
                                                          
1 “World War II: London in Color,” LIFE magazine, 2014. accessed April 1, 2014, 





to aid the war efforts of the country. Following the war, the CND ceased operations by 
June, 1921 as civil defense efforts were thought unnecessary.2 
The next time a need for civilian defense was deemed necessary was in 1933 
when President Franklin D. Roosevelt commissioned the National Emergency Council 
(NEC). By 1933 it was apparent that Europe was becoming unstable. Adolph Hitler and 
his National Socialist German Workers’ Party, more commonly referred to as the Nazi 
party, had been stirring up trouble since the 1930 elections when they became the second 
leading party in the government. Named Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, Hitler 
and his Nazis began a campaign that eventually caused World War II.3  The end result of 
the Nazis’ efforts led to the deaths of nearly fifty million civilians. The number may be 
significantly higher as there is no accurate record of civilian deaths in China and that 
number has been estimated as high as fifty million in that country alone.4 The NEC, like 
the previous councils before it, consisted of cabinet members as well as President 
Roosevelt and many agency heads. Roosevelt brought the Council of National Defense 
back to life in 1940 when Europe became engulfed in warfare to begin World War II. 
During World War II the tactic of bombing civilians that had started in World 
War I continued. This brought increased fear of a bombing on United States soil. New 
York mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, exhorted President Roosevelt to spearhead some sort of 
federal effort to protect the civilian population of the United States. According to La 
                                                          
2 Homeland Security, Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National 
Preparedness Efforts (Washington D.C.: United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 4-5.  
 
3 David Goldfield et al., Twentieth-Century America: A Social and Political History, 2nd ed. 
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. , 2013), 241-243.  
   
4 “By the Numbers: World-Wide Deaths,” The National World War II Museum, accessed April 1, 
2014, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-





Guardia, “up to this war and never in our history, has the civilian population been 
exposed to attack. The new technique of war has created the necessity for developing 
new techniques of civilian defense.” 5 LaGuardia and others feared a direct bombing 
attack on the United States, particularly the coasts. Plane spotters were trained to pick out 
the differences between Allied and Axis bombers from a distance, using the silhouette of 
the plane. Bombings were considered so definitive the United States Army Air Force 
created the Ground Observer Corps in 1941, prior to the bombing in Pearl Harbor. 
Trained spotters had books that “contained both photographs and silhouette drawings of 
all known warplanes of U.S., British, German, Italian, and Japanese air forces.”6 
President Roosevelt relied on advice from his wife Eleanor and her associate 
Florence Kerr, to create the Office of Civil Defense (OCD). Inspired by the work of her 
friend, Lady Stella Reading who served as the director of Women’s Voluntary Services 
for Civil Defense in England, Mrs. Roosevelt urged her husband to take advantage of the  
labor pool of women on the home front. President Roosevelt asked Florence Kerr, a 
woman in his administration as the head of the Works Progress Administration 
Community Service Projects, to lead the charge. Kerr and Eleanor Roosevelt collaborated 
on a report for the President titled “American Social Defense Organization.” The 
President entrusted the two women to put the framework in place for the Office of 
Civilian Defense (OCD). President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order in May of 1941 
                                                          
5 Elwyn A. Mauck, Civilian Defense in the United States: 1940-1945 (Unpublished manuscript by 
the Historical Officer of the Office of Civilian Defense, 1946), 55. Cited in Homeland Security, Civil 
Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National Preparedness Efforts (Washington D.C., 
United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 5.  
6 Sam Moore, “When Farmers Were Spotters: Farming the Homefront During World War II,” 
Farm Collector, June 2010, accessed March 25, 2014,  http://www.farmcollector.com/farm-life/farming-





and selected LaGuardia to lead the new office.7  Kerr and the first lady pushed the 
president to consider expanding the scope of the new office. Some of the President’s 
advisors wanted a more conservative mandate for the new office. However, President 
Roosevelt saw an opportunity to meet more of the country’s needs and authorized the 
OCD “to meet a wide array of needs, including the protection of the civilian population, 
the maintenance of morale, and the promotion of volunteer involvement in defense.”8 The 
President viewed this as another opportunity to expand his social agenda. Many in the 
Washington establishment and the rest of the country felt that the Roosevelts’ plans of 
incorporating social services with Civil Defense planning overstepped the original 
military preparatory mission of the program. A vocal segment of those in opposition to 
the “softer” side of Civil Defense planning felt that the whole program should be under 
the purview of the Department of War and not a civilian group.9 
At this time governors and other local officials reinstated the state and 
neighborhood chapters that had been active under the Council of National Defense.  
LaGuardia resisted the effort to change the focus of the OCD from that of a defensive 
organization. Rather than dilute the mission of civil defense, he wanted to concentrate on 
creating neighborhood militias. However, Eleanor Roosevelt strongly supported the many 
social welfare goals of the OCD including “morale maintenance, promotion of volunteer 
                                                          
 
7 Department of History George Washington University, “Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary: 
Office of Civilian Defense,” The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, accessed December 7, 2013,  
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/office-civilian-defense.crm, 1.  
 
8 Ibid.  
 






involvement, and nutrition and physical education.”10  She emerged from the background, 
where she stayed to prevent her presence being a drag on the new office, and joined with 
LaGuardia so that all of the objectives of the original mandate could be implemented. 
The criticism of the agency came from all sides. Those who did not like the social 
welfare aspects decried the overreach of government into people’s lives. Others believed 
that the civilian defense portion would be better served under the Department of War. 
President Roosevelt ignored all the criticisms, including all those who felt that the OCD 
should be mothballed after the end of World War II. 
With the end of World War II came the belief that the threat of an attack on the 
United States’ homeland was minimal. The head of OCD, James Landis, supported this 
school of thought and pressed for the closure of his own agency. After all, troops were 
returning home from Europe, having defeated Hitler and the Nazi regime, and Japan 
would soon meet the same fate. The United States was victorious and safe from further 
invasion. Civil defense was no longer necessary. With Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 
1945, Vice-President Harry Truman became the new President. The Truman years were 
marked by conflicting reports and disagreement between his advisors. Truman sided with 
Landis and others who felt the OCD had outlived its usefulness. He took office having 
only been Vice-President for a total of eighty-two days and knowing nothing about the 
secret nuclear weapons program. On June 4, 1945 he signed an Executive Order to end 
the OCD and by June 30, 1945 it was officially decommissioned. 
The entire world’s ideas of safety and rules of warfare changed dramatically with 
the introduction of the atomic bomb. Following the United States decision to drop two 
atomic bombs on Japan, the idea of war and civilian defense shifted. A report published 
                                                          





in 1946 by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey admitted that during World War II 
conventional bombing of civilians in Japan and Germany had been effective strategies. 
As one way to reduce the impact of civilian bombings in the United States in a future 
conflict, civilian defense plans should be adopted. The group advised the creation of 
plans to aid in the mobilization of civilians from urban areas to safer areas and shelters 
for those unable to evacuate the possible targeted areas.11 
An alternate report in 1947 by the War Department’s Civil Defense Board 
recommended the federal government stay out of civil defense planning. This report 
stated that local officials were best suited to know the requirements of protecting their 
communities. The role of the federal government was to offer resources to help local 
leaders best protect the civilians in their location.  
In 1947 the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was created by Congress 
in the same legislation that unleashed the Central Intelligence Agency on the world. The 
National Security Act of 1947 established the NSRB and charged it with developing 
“programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation’s natural and industrial 
resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the 
civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs 
and conditions.”12  With World War I, World War II, and the onset of the Cold War 
taking place within the span of thirty years, the United States government recognized that 
a procedure needed to be in place that would allow them to switch from a peace time 
economy to a war time economy quickly and efficiently. In addition, developing a plan to 
                                                          
11 Homeland Security, 6. 
 
12 “Text of the National Security Act of 1947,” United States Congress ONLINE, accessed 





ensure the safety and continuity of the food supply was crucial. The nation’s agricultural 
assets needed to be protected in case of nuclear attack to provide sustenance to survivors 
that would rebuild the country.    
Civil defense became a priority of the Truman administration when the 
geopolitical differences between the United States and the Soviet Union ratcheted up at 
the end of the 1940s. When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon on August 
29, 1949, the United States’ confidence shattered.13  The United States had been certain 
that it would take significantly longer for the Soviet Union to develop an atomic weapon. 
The possibility of a worldwide atomic war suddenly became all too real.14 
President Truman reevaluated the need for a civilian defense system, in part 
prompted by a study on civil defense operations and the establishment of a civil defense 
unit in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Recommended were several things 
including that a new agency for civil defense be created under the auspices of the OSD. 
In addition, this new office should be a permanent installation to help the United States 
prepare for the new realities of living in the atomic age. Truman acted on these 
recommendations and created the Office of Civil Defense and Planning (OCDP) March 
27, 1948.  
The United States’ first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, headed the newly 
created OCDP, but his term as head was characterized by major disagreements with 
                                                          
 
13 Jason Hall, ed., “Soviet Atomic Bomb Test,” The Cold War Museum, ONLINE, accessed 
December 1, 2013, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/soviet_atomic_bomb_test.asp, 1.   
 
14 On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced to a stunned Unites States populace that 
the Soviet Union had detonated their own atomic weapon less than three weeks previously.  
“Truman’s Statement on Detection of Soviet Atomic Test,” PBS American Experience, 2000, 
ONLINE, accessed March 25, 2014, 






President Truman about virtually every issue, including budget levels of the military and 
the size of the military that would be needed to combat the ongoing threat posed by the 
Soviet Union. In early 1949 Truman forced Forrestal to resign from both the OCDP and 
the Department of the Defense, but not before Forrestal had commissioned yet another 
committee to study the issue of Civil Defense. Russell Hopley, the president of 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, headed this new committee.15 Mr. Hopley 
selected a committee to work with and the group produced a three hundred page report 
that proposed the framework for a national civil defense organization. The committee 
recommended the federal government provide more of a support role and that the bulk of 
the preparations should be handled by local and regional leaders. The groups opposed to 
the recommendations included Congressional members objecting to the increased costs 
involved and civilian groups who feared possible over-reaching by the government and 
increased military control over civilian life.16 
It is at this point when the National Safety Resources Board (NSRB) was 
reinvigorated. Rather than establishing a civil defense office under the control of the 
OSD, President Truman gave responsibility of civil defense for the country to the NSRB. 
This effectively silenced those that feared a military intrusion into their lives. However, 
the NSRB received neither adequate authority nor material backing to effectively do its 
job. Consequently, the NSRB moved from agency to agency, never remaining under the 
control of any one agency for very long. First, the NSRB was transferred to the control of 
the Department of Defense. Then, it moved to the Executive Office of the President. 
                                                          
15 Jerry N. Hess, interview by Felix E. Larkin, September 18, 1972 and October 23, 1972, 
transcript ONLINE, accessed November 12, 2013, Truman Library 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/larkin.htm, 1.    
 





Finally, the NSRB found itself assigned to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). 
All of these transfers occurred between March 3, 1949 and December 1, 1950. During 
this period of transition,  the NSRB produced the first booklet to help the general public 
prepare for a nuclear war. In October 1950, the NSRB released the booklet titled Survival 
Under Atomic Attack.17  According to the booklet, “The civil defense program for this 
country must be in constant readiness because for the first time in 136 years an enemy 
has the power to attack our cities in strong force, and for the first time in our history that 
attack may come suddenly, with little or no warning.” The information provided to the 
general public through the early efforts of NSRB provided superficial information-little 
technical or scientific information. The advice provided in the booklet compares 
radioactivity from nuclear bombs to that received from x-rays and sunburn.18   
The Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities were a surprise to the United States. They 
did not know in advance about the Soviet Union’s first nuclear testing in 1949 and they 
did not know the extent of any other nuclear capabilities. Uncertainty drove the panic of 
the 1950s, unlike the 1960s conflicts over the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The anxiety felt in the 1950s was the reason behind the nuclear tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the preemptive 
strike as a viable solution to defeating the Soviet Union in 1950. The idea of being able to 
disarm the Soviet Union before a war even began proved popular with both the military 
and civilians.19 
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With the establishment of the ODM in 1950 and the successful testing of an 
atomic weapon by the Soviet Union in 1949, a new era dawned. The general public as 
well as local government leaders clamored for a definitive plan to help them prepare for 
an entirely too real possibility of an atomic attack by the Soviet Union. Congress 
responded in December 1950 by passing the Federal Civil Defense Act thereby 
establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). 
The FCDA produced a flurry of pamphlets and educational material aimed at 
helping many facets of the American population survive an atomic attack. The agency 
published numerous fallout shelter designs and instructions on how to build them. In 
addition, material instructing the public how to deal with nuclear fallout was published in 
virtually every newspaper around the country. Children were introduced to Bert, an 
animated turtle who showed them the proper way to protect themselves in case they were 
near a nuclear explosion. An entire generation grew up watching Bert the turtle in the 
infamous Duck and Cover public service announcement produced by Ray Maurer and 
Anthony Rizzo in 1951, at the request of the FCDA.20  Bert was seen in a cartoon, 
coloring book, and comic book for decades. Bert marketing was one of several efforts 
made to indoctrinate children in the United States in the value of nuclear safety. The 
National Education Association’s Commission on Safety Education, school officials from 
Massachusetts to Los Angeles, and the FCDA’s Division of Education and Training 
supported these efforts. The general sentiment at the time was that if the children could 
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be convinced of the necessity of being ready in an instant to react to a nuclear attack, they 
would bring their parents into the fold.21 
Women became another target audience. The FCDA created a campaign aimed at 
women that evoked images of earlier times titled “Grandma’s Pantry.”22  In addition to 
the pamphlet with this name produced by the FCDA, newspapers around the country 
published excerpts and encouraged their readers to stock up with a three day supply of 
food and water for their families. As the St. Petersburg Times stated, “The modern 
housewife, who can hop in her car and drive to the nearest super market to pick up the 
ingredients for the evening meal at a moment’s notice, does not regard her pantry with 
the same respect as grandma did.”23  The article listed the FCDA recommended list of 
three day supplies for one person. The categories listed were canned milk with the 
recommendation of fourteen to fifteen ounces of either dry or canned evaporated milk per 
person, canned meat with the recommended amount of twelve ounces, canned soups with 
the recommended amount of twelve ounces, canned vegetables with the recommended 
amount of twelve to sixteen ounces; following these items was an extensive list of 
miscellaneous items and their recommended amounts.24 All the wife needed to do was 
take the list, multiply the quantity by the number of people in her family, and purchase 
the recommended amounts.  
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Women were also urged to decorate their home fallout shelters and provide a 
homey place for their families to ride out an atomic attack. A pictorial essay from Life 
magazine showed a family in their shelter. The picture featured the parents and three 
children seated-the parents in lawn chairs and children on the carpeted floor. Their 
survival supplies, cupboard doors open to show rows of canned goods and first-aid 
supplies surrounded them. According to the accompanying article, each member of the 
family had a role to play in their successful survival of an attack. The father was 
responsible for the tools necessary for survival and security; the mother’s role was to 
stock and rotate the supplies her family needed. Each of the children had a specific duty 
within the shelter; “Daughter Charlene is in charge of bedding for the folding cots and 
fold-up bunks. Son Claude looks after the candles, flashlights, transistor radio and a fresh 
supply of batteries. Daughter Judy is the shelter librarian with a stock of books and games 
to help pass the time.”25  The FCDA worked tirelessly to promote the idea of the 
survivability of an atomic attack, if only one were adequately prepared. 
The notion that an atomic attack by the Soviet Union was survivable took a hit in 
1953. The Soviet Union successfully tested their first hydrogen nuclear bomb. The 
destruction capabilities of this new type of bomb made surviving in a home built shelter 
impossible. At the unbelievable size of 400 Kilotons of TNT, the hydrogen bomb was 
twenty six times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The Soviet Union created a succession of ever more powerful hydrogen bombs, resulting 
in the creation and detonation of the world’s largest thermonuclear device.26   Due to the 
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power of these new weapons, the FCDA began recommending the strategy of mass 
evacuations from urban centers rather than the shelter model. 
This new strategy became popular with President Dwight Eisenhower, who had 
always held the position that state and local leaders should be responsible for civil 
defense rather than the Federal government. The efforts to promote mass evacuations 
gained increasing support until the United States government blasted the Bikini Atoll 
with a colossal thermonuclear bomb named Bravo. The wind shifted following detonation 
and radioactive fallout dispersed over seven thousand square miles and affected a 
Japanese fishing crew and the test personnel. When the public found out about the 
incident and the resulting illnesses as a result of the radioactive fallout, there was an 
increased demand for shelters capable of protecting citizens from drifting fallout that 
would follow any nuclear attack.27 
The Eisenhower administration still supported the idea of mass evacuations, in 
part due to the efforts underway to expand the federal highway system. The head of the 
FCDA wanted Congress to divert money from the highway program to federal civil 
defense. Once again the Civil Defense agenda lost out to a more popular one and the 
funding levels demonstrated that lack of support. The President was determined to 
complete a nationwide highway system and was unwilling to divert funding to the other 
programs, including the FCDA.28 
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The mass evacuation program limped along for a few years until Congressman 
Chester Holifield of California convened a House Committee on Government Operations 
in 1956 to look into the effectiveness of the FCDA. Holifield, elected in 1942, served on 
the House Subcommittee on Legislation and Military Operations, was chairman of the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a number of times, and was one of the few in either 
chamber of Congress to protest and vote against the Emergency Detention Act.29 He was 
informed on the subjects of the military and nuclear science. In addition, he was well 
respected in Washington D.C. and not afraid to speak his mind, even if it went against 
popular opinion.           
The findings of the “Holifield Hearings” were that the federal government had 
focused its efforts on evacuation to the exclusion of other solutions. There were at least 
two reasons for the tunnel vision of the FCDA. The first being that the evacuation plans 
were vastly cheaper than building enough public shelters to adequately house citizens. By 
encouraging evacuation, the costs were shifted to individuals and local governments 
rather than the federal government. The second reason was that Eisenhower was pouring 
billions of dollars into creating a national highway system; the Eisenhower administration 
used the idea of mass evacuations as a benefit of having a national highway system. 
These funds allowed homeowners to get low cost loans to convert their basements into 
shelters or build fallout shelters in the backyard. According to one source, the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) had several programs that would help homeowners 
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finance a shelter, including one that allowed a homeowner to borrow up to $3500 for a 
maximum of five years. There were a few restrictions on the money including that the 
shelter needed to meet the “standards of the office of Civil Defense Mobilization and the 
FHA, who would make the inspections of construction.”30 The article also suggests that 
people create dual purpose spaces that can be used by the family everyday but serve as a 
fallout shelter when needed in an emergency; suggestions for these rooms include dark 
rooms, dens, and laundry rooms.31 
The “Holifield Hearings” took place in 1956 and for the next decade the push was 
toward home fallout shelters in suburban and rural areas and public shelters in urban 
areas, with mass evacuation as an alternative plan. Several other reports followed that 
confirmed the importance of civil defense to act as a deterrent in this new type of 
warfare. The first was a report released in 1957 and produced by the Gaither Committee, 
convened at the request of President Eisenhower. This report concluded that based on 
current military readiness, the U.S. was unable to effectively defend itself from a surprise 
attack by the Soviet Union. This report recommended that fallout shelters be provided a 
measure of deterrence. The belief being that if enough people survived the initial attack, a 
substantial counter-attack could be mounted. Next came the Rockefeller Report that had, 
among others, Henry Kissinger on its panel, and the second a report published by the 
RAND Corporation. Kissinger recommended that Civil Defense would be an effective 
part of a serious effort towards deterrent and the RAND report stated much the same 
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opinion.32 The federal government believed that civil defense was a part of an effective 
strategy of deterrence, but did not want to pay for it. The government wanted to pour 
more money into military capabilities and civil defense detracted from that. Particularly 
during the Eisenhower administration, the Secretary of State and military leaders did not 
support the shelter idea out of fear of decreasing the military’s budget. They felt the 
money would be better spent on retaliatory efforts rather than protecting civilians. Even 
Eisenhower himself did not support the shelter efforts, under his watch the FCDA did 
little but inform the public about the benefit of home shelters and count existing shelters. 
Eisenhower decommissioned the FCDA and introduced the Office of Civil and Defense 
Mobilization.33 
Eisenhower may not have wanted to invest in shelters for the general public, but 
during his tenure he had a huge bunker commissioned for use by members of Congress 
and their staffs. The concept of “continuity of government” was the motivating factor 
behind these shelters. “Continuity of government” plans detail the line of succession for 
the federal government in case multiple members of the Executive Branch are killed in 
any kind of disaster, although they were specifically planning for a nuclear attack from 
the 1950s through the present day. The Presidential Line of Succession Act of 1947 
changed the protocol for determining who would take over for the President in the 
circumstance that he was unable or unavailable to carry out his duties. An earlier version 
had removed the Senate president pro tem and Speaker of the House from the line of 
succession. This version replaced them, however put the Speaker ahead of the president 
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pro tem.34 Later “continuity of government” plans were developed for every major 
branch of government.  
To help provide for the survival of as many of the administration in Washington 
D.C., a number of nuclear shelters were built within one hour’s drive of the D.C. 
metropolitan area. This distance was chosen to provide an easy commute in times of 
disaster, but allow enough distance from the city to remove it from any immediate blast 
damage. Built into a mountain underneath an existing luxury hotel, the Greenbrier Hotel, 
in White Sulphur Springs, Virginia, the Congressional bunker would be the post-
apocalyptic home for eleven hundred people. This figure included one hundred senators, 
four hundred and thirty five representatives, five hundred staffers, and surprisingly no 
family members.35 President Truman commissioned and built a similar shelter in 1950. 
Site R or the Raven Rock Mountain Complex was built into the Catoctin Mountains on 
the edge of Pennsylvania and six miles from Camp David. Officially designated the 
“Alternate Joint Communications Center,” Site R was designed to be a backup location 
for the Pentagon and military leaders in case of nuclear war.36 In addition, there is Mount 
Weather located on five hundred acres in Virginia. This facility’s actual origins remain a 
mystery. All that is known is that it was built sometime in the 1950s and  started as a 
                                                          
34 “Presidential Succession Act,” United States Senate accessed April 2, 2014,  
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Presidential_Succession_Act.htm, 1.  
 
35 NPR Staff, “The Secret Bunker Congress Never Used,” National Public Radio March 26, 2011 
accessed May 1, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2011/03/26/134379296/the-secret-bunker-congress-never-used, 
1. 
 
36 Bill Gifford, “Bunker? What Bunker?” The New York Times Magazine December 3, 2000. 





presidential hideaway in case of nuclear war. This location is officially home to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).37  
When you consider the array of bunkers in the Washington D.C. area, the safety 
of government officials seemed assured. For the Truman and Eisenhower administrations 
and essentially every administration since then, the average American’s safety and 
security during a nuclear attack was not a priority, they were basically on their own The 
government’s continuity plans only include protecting themselves, not necessarily their 
constituents. Any planning to ensure the safety of civilians was left up to the local 
authorities or to the individuals themselves. 
The importance of civil defense changed dramatically when President Kennedy 
took office in January 1961. Kennedy took office during a time of heightened tensions 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, primarily due to the actions of Kennedy 
and his administration. During the Presidential campaign of 1960, Kennedy had 
deliberately exaggerated the disparity in missiles between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. He had used this as a campaign issue against his opponent. He had 
deliberately exaggerated the Soviet missile technology, as well as the capabilities of their 
aircraft to carry them to the United States homeland. In addition, he underestimated the 
number and capability of the United States’ arsenal. His misinformation was intentional 
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because in July of 1960, in the midst of his campaign, both he and his running mate, 
Lyndon Johnson, were briefed on many intelligence issues including Soviet missile 
capabilities.38  Kennedy’s public claims of ignorance reinforced Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev’s view of him as young and inexperienced. When he and Khrushchev met 
for a summit at Vienna in June of 1961, Khrushchev’s opinion remained unchanged. The 
goal had been to establish a basis for trust between the two governments, instead when 
Kennedy returned to Washington D.C. he did so knowing that Khrushchev’s distrust was 
growing.39 Then in August of 1961, literally overnight, the Soviet Union built a wall 
separating the two sides of Berlin. The wall was an effort to try to prevent the 
approximately two thousand East Germans crossing into West Berlin daily. The people 
leaving included scientists, skilled workers, and intellectuals.40  In addition, President 
Kennedy and his brother Robert, the newly appointed Attorney General of the United 
States, had an obsession with the revolutionary leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro, who would 
later become Prime Minister of Cuba. They feared the revolutionary zeal he brought to 
Cuba would spread. This preoccupation resulted in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
orchestrating over a dozen assassination attempts on Castro’s life, numerous efforts to 
foment a counter revolution in Cuba, a mock invasion of a nearby island under the thinly 
disguised codename “Ostrac,”  and even one try to convince the Cuban population that 
they were witnessing the second coming of Jesus Christ.41 
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The barrage of attempts on Prime Minister Castro’s life added to all the other 
operations caused him to fear a United States military invasion of his nation. Castro 
turned to the Soviet Union and Nikita Khrushchev in his time of need. He repeatedly 
requested help from Khrushchev and clearly stated he feared imminent attack by the 
United States. In the following excerpt from a letter that Castro wrote to Khrushchev on 
October 26, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he says, “Given the analysis 
of the situation and the reports that have reached us, [I] consider an attack to be almost 
imminent—within the next 24 to 72 hours.”42 By this time the Soviet Union had 
delivered forty three thousand troops and ninety eight tactical nuclear warheads to Cuba. 
In addition, they had mid-range missiles in Cuba that could reach Washington D.C. and 
New York, which the United States intelligence community did not know about. The 
United States believed not only that they were going to be able to keep Soviet missiles 
from reaching Cuba, but that they had the right to. The Soviet Union had delivered them 
and set them up prior to the United States detecting them. The United States intelligence 
agencies were so busy planning assassination attempts on Castro, they missed thousands 
of Soviet troops and nearly one hundred nuclear warheads being delivered to Cuba. 
The underlying problem in the whole scenario was that President Kennedy, 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and the CIA failed to recognize that Cuba was a 
separate entity from the United States. They continued to treat Cuba like a protectorate, 
with no right to do what it wanted to do. When threatened by the United States, Castro 
felt he had no choice but to try to defend himself and his country. Castro contacted the 
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Soviet Union out of fear, born out of the multiple attacks on his life and his nation by the 
United States. In a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy at the height of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Khrushchev told Kennedy that he will authorize the dismantling of the missiles in 
Cuba. He asked for one thing in return, a promise from Kennedy not to attack Cuba.43 
The period from 1960 to 1963 was the most active time period for civil defense. 
President Kennedy wrote an open letter to the public that was published in Life magazine 
on September 15, 1961. In this letter he states that “nuclear weapons and the possibility 
of nuclear war are facts of life we cannot ignore today.”44 In addition, he encouraged 
citizens to build fallout shelters, “I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of 
this issue of Life. The security of our country and the peace of the world are the 
objectives of our policy.”45 The article that followed contained plans for various fallout 
shelters and pictorials of typical families building and stocking their own fallout shelters. 
The final article of the series was a “[r]undown of things to remember in case attack 
should come.” It included information about the difference in a Civil Defense attack for 
an alert versus one for a warning to take cover. In the case of an alert the Civil Defense 
siren would send out a three to five minute blast and in the case of a warning the siren 
would send out a three minute period of short blasts or a wailing siren. In addition, the 
article outlined the steps that would happen if a nuclear blast occurred in your area 
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including the three stages of an attack: the flash, the shockwave, and the fallout.46 The 
cover of the magazine featured a man in a radiation suit to reinforce the message. 
Under the Kennedy administration the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization 
split into the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) and the Office of Civil Defense 
(OCD) by Executive Order on July 20, 1961. The OEP became part of the Executive 
Office and was responsible for non-military emergency preparation and civil defense. 
The OCD became part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of 
Defense. The OCD was responsible for civil defense at the national level, especially the 
fallout shelter program.47 
Thanks in large part to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the cause of civil defense 
jumped to the forefront. President Kennedy received all of the $200 million he asked for 
from Congress to address the issue of finding and stocking public shelters. The goal 
being to provide room for as many individuals as possible in the current public shelter 
locations. 
The massive shift in policy can be attributed to the idea of that in order to win a 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union as many citizens as possible had to survive in the 
United States to continue the American way of life. This was in direct contrast to the 
previous administrations of Truman and Eisenhower. These administrations had fully 
supported the buildup of the military and the building of secret shelters for government 
use only. The Kennedy administration’s new emphasis included businesses, 
manufacturing companies, and private citizens. It was incumbent on everyone to prepare 
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themselves to survive a nuclear war so that the United States could return to “normal” as 
quickly as possible. To this end, companies like Shell Oil Company and AT&T had 
continuity plans in place and bunker locations for executives to hide out and continue to 
operate their businesses in the event of a nuclear attack. States and local communities 
devised emergency plans to inform their citizens of the proper actions to take in the event 
of a nuclear attack. Private citizens built fallout shelters in their backyards and basements 
to ensure their families safety in the event of a nuclear attack. Everyone hoped that if the 
Soviet Union believed that the majority of United States citizens could survive a nuclear 
attack the Soviet Union would hesitate to launch their nuclear weapons if total 
destruction of the United States was not assured.  The deterrent factor that had been 






URBAN AND SUBURBAN SURVIVAL PLANS 
The factors considered in strategic survival planning varied by community size 
and location. Metropolitan locations or urban centers had different needs than suburban 
areas did and rural and agricultural areas were completely different than either of the 
previous two areas. Those involved in Civil Defense planning had to consider all of these 
constituent populations when designing programs.  
According to the United States Census Bureau in 1960, an urban community is 
one that has a population of two thousand five hundred or more. There was no official 
delineation for suburban.1 A more helpful definition appears on the Census Bureau’s 
current website. The updated definition of an urbanized area is one that is larger than fifty 
thousand people. The qualification for an urban cluster might be a good descriptor for a 
suburban area, a community that is larger than two thousand five hundred people and less 
than fifty thousand people.2 
The focus of both the urban and suburban community survival plans was to 
protect the civilian populations that lived in the specific areas. These areas made 
attractive targets because of the population density. Bombs aimed at cities would cause 
more damage through sheer numbers alone. Until the mid-1960s when missile silos 
started being built in rural areas, the biggest threat faced by rural populations was drifting 
radioactive fallout. The different threats faced by the various communities were one of 
the reasons for a change in survival strategy for those in rural and agricultural 
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communities. Another reason the urban and suburban plans focused on separate messages 
than those for rural and agricultural areas is that the latter had to factor livestock and crop 
protection into their survival plans. For those in urban or suburban locals, their only 
concern was to protect themselves and their families. Rural and agricultural residents had 
more extensive responsibilities. They needed to guarantee that enough of their livestock 
and crops survived to continue providing for the hungry survivors who emerged from 
their urban public shelters or suburban basement shelters when the all clear was signaled. 
During the Roosevelt administration the plan for the urban population was for the 
government to build and equip community shelters. However, Congress was reluctant to 
allocate adequate funds that would have been necessary to sufficiently protect even a 
fraction of the civilian population. During the Truman administration there was a shift to 
local control of Civil Defense efforts. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) 
led efforts to help local communities identify public shelters, provide supplies to 
stockpile for future use, and establish a uniform warning system to be used in case of 
attack. 
During the Eisenhower administration efforts shifted to focus on evacuation.  The 
new interstate highway system, Eisenhower’s signature effort, was touted as an efficient 
way to transfer the population from targeted locations to less populated, safer areas. 
Another issue that factored into Eisenhower’s support of evacuation over shelters was the 
increasing size of the nuclear bombs. This more powerful bomb that the Soviet Union 
detonated in 1953 created the belief that cities would be unlivable if attacked with a 
hydrogen bomb, whether people were in shelters or not. The only possible way to protect 





However, one of the biggest problems with evacuation versus shelter was the 
warning time involved. Once the onus for protection of civilians shifted to local 
governments, many states created formal survival plans trying to consider all 
contingencies that were possible in their specific location following an attack. The 
information in the following passages came from the State of Kansas Operational 
Survival Plans. The plan included a Basic Plan and several additions specific to various 
cities around the state that could expect to be affected if Kansas were the target of an 
attack on the United States. The whole plan was printed and distributed around the state 
to local Civil Defense Agencies in 1958. 
The formal survival plans had contingencies for several different Warning 
conditions including: Strategic Warning (8 hours or more), Tactical Warning (1/2 to 8 
hours), Attack Imminent and/or No Warning (1/2 hour or less). The Warning conditions 
began with an announcement of a Strategic Warning, this meant that the President or the 
Congress proclaimed a state of emergency, usually in response to growing international 
problems. With a Strategic Warning, the State Warning System started broadcasting 
emergency warnings. The public was subject to voluntary evacuation at this stage. If 
conditions progressed, the next step was a Tactical Warning. A Tactical Warning came 
from the FCDA National Warning System Headquarters. A warning such as this would 
be in response to military intelligence indicating a likely attack within a matter of hours. 
The public located in a Target Area faced mandatory evacuation. The next stage would 
be Attack Imminent. Again, this designation came from the FCDA Headquarters. This 
warning would be issued upon visual verification of enemy forces or destructive devices. 





the storm.3 Bomb size and destructive power increased and improved missile technology 
allowed for multiple bombs to be launched from stealth submarines located off either of 
the United States’ coasts instead of the previous long-distance bomber planes.  Warning 
times decreased and the challenge became how to evacuate an entire city with less than 
thirty minutes? In 1950 the total urban population numbered just over ninety million, and 
by 1960 that same population had grown to over one hundred thirteen million. In the 
event of a nuclear attack on the United States tens of millions of people would need to be 
evacuated to “Reception Areas.”4 Reception Areas were less populated areas designated 
to play host to refugees from urban centers and other targeted areas like military bases in 
the event of nuclear war. For the Kansas City, Kansas metropolitan area as an example, 
the 1960 population of 475,539 people needed to be moved to the smaller communities 
further out in the state of Kansas, like Emporia, Atchison, and Doniphan to name a few.5 
If even one third of the cities were attacked in the initial wave, that is still over 
thirty million people that need to be evacuated. If it is a school day, how do parents 
collect their children and leave the city in the specified time? As many city residents, 
particularly on the east coast, do not own a private vehicle how does the city coordinate 
public transport for evacuation? All of these questions and many more needed to be 
addressed in a formal survival plan. The evacuation plan for Kansas City, Kansas reads in 
part: 
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It is expected that with the sounding of sirens and the employment of other 
warning media indicating a potential attack, individual and mob panic will 
be an unwanted but highly probable result. The degree to which hysteria 
prevails will to a large extent by dependent upon each individual’s 
awareness of what positive action to take in accordance with established 
plans. The providing of designated evacuation routes from Target Areas in  
 itself is insufficient to secure maximum survival of human life. Additional  
 provision must be made for the direction of evacuees and for other basic   
 needs, both within the Target Area and along the routes leading to safety.  
 From any point within the Target Area sufficient routes have been laid out 
to allow all persons the possibility of escape. Designated routes provide   
 the most direct and expeditious egress from the danger area since they   
 utilize surfaced roads traversing radially away from the points of danger  
 and have no serious intersections.6 
 
The plan mentioned that Kansas City area residents were to use residential cars and 
trucks as their primary means of evacuation and expressly rules out the use of trains and 
planes as being impractical. In fact, the plan indicates that in case of an attack all train 
traffic must give the right of way to vehicular traffic to allow better traffic flow. Every 
neighborhood was assigned a number and had a corresponding primary evacuation route, 
alternate evacuation route, and transfer route. If a person found themselves in an area 
other than their home neighborhood when the alarms went off they were to evacuate 
according to their present location, not their home location. Evacuation operations were 
to be managed by the police force including reserves and auxiliaries as needed to 
maintain control of the operation and had absolute and final authority over everyone 
within the Target Area.7 
One of the major reasons for bringing civil defense training into the nation’s 
schools was to alleviate anxiety in the first generation of children faced with nuclear war. 
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The introduction of civil defense training programs including the animated Bert the 
Turtle, dog tags for identification, and duck and cover drills. Duck and cover drills 
involved children diving under their desks or against a wall and covering the back of their 
necks to protect it from radiation, all on a teacher’s command or with the sound of an air-
raid siren. Bert the Turtle was an animated character who demonstrated the duck and 
cover technique in a cartoon, coloring book, and comic book and emphasized that when 
the attack came to remain calm. In addition, schools in large cities started issuing dog 
tags to their students to enable authorities to identify bodies in case of a nuclear attack. 
However, that purpose was never publicized and many preferred to believe that they were 
to help in identifying lost children and aiding in reuniting them with their families. A side 
market emerged for those companies that provided metal bead chain necklaces for use 
with the dog tags issued by the armed forces. The chain companies started advertising 
their product in the backs of comic books and school magazines.8  Those that came of age 
during the 1950s and 1960s have a different view of safety than previous generations. 
They grew up with duck and cover drills, Bert the Turtle, and the threat of a nuclear 
cloud permanently hanging over their world. 
Suburban communities were close enough to heavily populated urban areas that 
were likely to be targeted. But far enough away that the government figures informed 
people they would be safe. For instance, a five megaton surface nuclear blast would cause 
a one-half mile crater at the site of the explosion. The resulting damage emerges from the 
center in outward in concentric circles. The first circle encompasses three miles in all 
directions of the blast and would kill everyone within the circle. The next two circles 
continue out to seven miles from the center and the damage varies from heavy to 
                                                          





moderate. From seven to nine miles out the expected damage is light and beyond nine 
miles there should be no damage. The largest risk outside the blast range would be from 
radioactive fallout.9 
Home fallout shelters were the solution stressed in virtually all of the newly 
formed suburban communities in the 1960s. The only exceptions to this plan were those 
communities that fell within Target Areas, due to proximity to a military target or other 
high risk target. Many of the suburban communities were in fact “Support Areas” or 
areas that would play host to those evacuating at the first hint of a possible attack. The 
government expected suburban residents to not only save themselves, but also all of the 
refugees that would be coming their way from nearby cities. 
The efforts to convince suburbanites to build a fallout shelter in their basement or 
backyard took many forms. The federal government produced pamphlets and booklets 
that gave detailed instructions for building both permanent and improvised fallout 
shelters. Many local entities from state civil defense agencies to city newspapers 
reprinted these materials and distributed them to their local populations. One such 
example of this is a serial printing of Survival under Atomic Attack cut out of the local 
newspaper by one family and pinned together.10 The collected information was stored in 
the family copy of Personal and Family Survival.11 The two items were printed over a 
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decade apart, but someone in the family that resided at 423 Box 72 in Imperial, Nebraska 
felt strongly enough about the issue of Civil Defense and preparedness to keep the 
information safe and together. When found at an auction, the book and clippings were 
with miscellaneous first-aid items. They were likely the remnants of the original owners 
civil defense preparations. 
Another pamphlet was Family Shelter Designs published by the OCD and 
Department of Defense. This concise work contained eight different designs for variously 
styled fallout shelters. Also included were material lists, construction instructions, basic 
blueprints, and technical information for each of the eight designs. The plans ranged from 
a basic lean-to shelter in a basement with sand as the shielding material, to the more 
elaborate brick masonry shelter that was designed to be built at the same time as a new 
house.12 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many home shelters were built. Many 
people converted a space they currently had into a secondary use as a fallout shelter. 
Rather than build a new single use room, they turned a corner of their basement or their 
storm cellar to serve as a temporary haven in case of nuclear attack. In addition, it is 
impossible to know how many secretly built fallout shelters in their basements or 
backyards without telling anyone, including their neighbors. These people were preparing 
to save their families, but they did not want the entire neighborhood showing up on their 
doorstep wanting in at the first sign of danger. As Father L. C. McHugh, associate editor 
of the Jesuit magazine America, said, “To love one’s neighbor as thyself, he argued, was 
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undoubtedly a ‘heroic’ Christian virtue, but it was not a Christian duty. Indeed, it was 
‘misguided charity’ not to shoot a neighbor trying to invade one’s jam-packed shelter.”13 
Another way that suburban residents were exhorted to prepare for a possible 
nuclear attack was through popular media. The biggest of these was the Life magazine 
issue dated September 15, 1961. The cover featured a man in a radiation suit along with 
the headline of, “How you can SURVIVE FALLOUT.” A personal appeal from President 
John F. Kennedy started off the thirteen page pictorial essay.14 In this letter from the 
President he outlines his argument for building shelters, both public and private. His last 
paragraph includes this plea: 
I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of LIFE. The  
 security of our country and the peace of the world are the objectives of our policy. 
 But in these dangerous days when both these objectives are threatened we must  
 prepare for all eventualities. The ability to survive coupled with the will to do so 
 therefore are essential to our country.15 
This simple message came weeks after the Soviet Union erected the Berlin Wall and one 
year before the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy had been in office less than one 
year and he felt compelled to write an open letter to the general public and have it 
published in a popular news magazine. The President wanted to impress on people how 
important the issue of nuclear preparedness was. 
At the bottom of the page is the following series of sentences, “You could be 
among the 97% to survive if you follow advice on these pages … How to build shelters 
…Where to hide in cities … What to do during an attack.”16 With one exception, all of 
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the pictures and plans that follow apply exclusively to those who live in the suburbs. The 
plans assume that one owns a single family home with a basement or a big backyard that 
one could use to build a fallout shelter in. One picture shows the “typical” teenage girl 
using her family’s fallout shelter as her private clubhouse, with a cola in one hand and a 
telephone handset in the other.17 There was not a minority or apartment dweller among 
those pictured in the photo essay. This particular message was targeted to white middle 
class suburbanites, although it was ostensibly in a nationwide magazine. Published 
approximately one year before the Cuban missile crisis, this edition of LIFE magazine 
was timely as tensions in the Cold War had ratcheted up. In addition, with the President 
making the argument that it was every citizen’s duty to his/her country to survive an 
attack, the message was pervasive. 
In addition to preparing personal fallout shelters for their families, those living in 
the suburbs needed to prepare to play host to those evacuated out of Target Areas. Even 
though there was a big push for family fallout shelters, President Kennedy commissioned 
a survey of all public spaces that would be suitable for use as a public shelter in times of 
nuclear attack. In cities, public shelters would be used for those that could not evacuate. 
In suburban areas, public shelters would house evacuees from cities. As reported in the 
1962 fiscal year report signed by Robert S. McNamara, more than fifty five million 
shelter spaces had been identified by the end of fiscal year through that survey.18 This 
meant that someone in the government realized that with mass evacuations came refuges 
that needed somewhere to go; the Support Areas would be that somewhere. Every Target 
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Area was assigned at least one Support Area to funnel its people to. Some cities needed 
more than one Support Area to handle all of the potential evacuees. Other Target Areas 
needed contingency Support Areas in case their primary ones were unreachable due to 
unexpected circumstances like additional bombs or shifting winds carrying fallout. 
An example of the plans for a Support Area can be found in the Kansas Survival 
Plan Project. There are a number of Target Areas in Kansas, including Kansas City, 
Wichita, Topeka, Junction City, and Salina. Junction City and Salina made the Target 
Area list due to their proximity to military targets rather than what the cities actually 
contained. Each of these Target Areas have a Support Area, although some Support 
Areas are shared by more than one Target Area. While not considered primary Target 
Areas, there are a number of surrounding counties that were likely to be too damaged to 
be Support Areas either. These counties included Leavenworth, Jackson, Jefferson, and 
Riley. Support Area one acts as the host area for refugees from both the Topeka and 
Kansas City Target Areas.19 Those tasked with figuring out the specifics of life after a 
nuclear attack made a meticulous survey of the assets contained within Support Area one 
and how they might best be utilized. Each city within the Support Area is named and the 
useful industrial facilities in the city are listed. For example, 
Emporia has a number of small food processors, including one meat packing 
company, four dairies, three bakeries, and one poultry house. It has only one 
producer of animal feed. In the field of metal fabrication Emporia possesses four 
concerns. There is also one manufacturer of storage batteries, one soybean oil and 
meal mill, one woodworking plant, two producers of building materials, and five 
commercial printers.20 
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The assessment goes on to evaluate each of the major towns within the Support Area. In 
addition, there is a discussion of converting the existing factors to produce what is needed 
for recovery, rather than what is necessarily currently produced. The report notes that 
some factories currently produce lawnmowers, snow plows, aluminum doors, and many 
other items that may not be necessary during an emergency. However, the high amount of 
welding done at these factories ensures that they can turn out basic tools and parts as 
necessary.21 This capability will aid in the rebuilding of the infrastructure and buildings 
damaged by any nuclear attack. In addition to the manufacturing assets, the planning 
extended to the number of evacuees expected. The planners estimated that as many as 
two hundred seventy three thousand people may leave the Kansas City area for the 
Support Area. Therefore they had a list of the major towns in the Support Area and the 
number of evacuees they could be expected to house. For example, Atchison was 
expected to house thirty three thousand whereas Doniphan was expected to house only 
five thousand evacuees. The total number listed under all the towns added up to 
approximately the same number as expected in the event of evacuation following a 
nuclear attack.22 The details contained within the state plans appear complete, but do not 
consider the behavior and emotions of the people involved. The planners assumed that 
everyone would evacuate the Target Areas as instructed, in a neat and orderly manner. 
The Support Areas would welcome the evacuees into their communities and share their 
resources because it was for the good of the country. This completely ignored the blind 
panic that most people would experience with a legitimate warning of an imminent 
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nuclear attack on their location and the tendency of human beings to become territorial 
and protective of limited resources during a crisis. 
 While much of the early material produced by the FCDA and OCD was for the 
general public, the end of the fifties brought a change occurred. Specific groups were the 
recipients of messages designed to help them in their unique circumstances. In addition, 
the OEP and OCD recruited other federal agencies, like the United States Department of 





RURAL SURVIVAL PLANS 
 
The geopolitical events of the early 1960s significantly influenced the actions of 
the United States government and its citizens. This was the height of the Cold War, the 
working relationship of President Kennedy and Soviet Premiere Khrushchev was ever 
more strained as they faced off over the Berlin Wall and the missiles in Cuba. This 
tension led to the proliferation of magazine articles, newspaper serials, and government 
published materials all with the same goal: preparing the American public to survive a 
nuclear war. 
The OCD started targeting the agricultural community with information provided 
by scientists from the United States Department of Agriculture. The information provided 
to rural and agricultural communities was significantly different than that provided to the 
general public. These groups were given technical and scientific information designed to 
help them protect themselves, their livestock, and their crops. Information regarding 
specific types of radiation that could be expected in fallout. The level of detail provided 
was thought important so that farmers and livestock producers would understand the 
necessity of correctly protecting their livestock, crops, and land. 
As with other demographics, the government enlisted some popular media to 
address the issue with farmers. These included a 1962 article in Successful Farming, a 
1962 article in Nebraska Farmer, the 1961 article in LIFE magazine that pictured a farm 
family sheltering with their livestock in their barn. In addition to the popular media, the 
government produced a number of brochures, pamphlets, and Public Service 





In the days before ubiquitous large chain stores that pushed out locally owned 
retailers, families living in rural areas lived differently than their urban counterparts. This 
was particularly true for those that lived on farms and ranches. Thus the government 
found a receptive audience in this constituency. Rural residents were used to growing and 
canning their own food, storing large amounts of staple goods, taking less frequent trips 
to town for shopping, and in general living a more self-reliant lifestyle. This population 
was accustomed to their independence, fending for themselves, and taking care of their 
own responsibilities.  While the primary goal of the campaign was to prepare their 
families and the secondary goal was to protect their livestock and crops, there was 
another message. The tertiary message included in the survival information aimed at the 
rural population was that following a nuclear attack, citizens may be isolated and without 
governmental help. In addition, this population had other things to take into account if a 
nuclear attack happened; they were caretakers of their livestock and land. The preparation 
materials aimed at this population featured information and messages aimed to address 
the unique interests of the rural citizen. These interests included protecting their family, 
sheltering their livestock, and preserving the fertility of the land needed to feed and water 
both. 
The United States’ government had one goal following any nuclear attack: to get 
the country up and running again. One of the ways to accomplish that feat was to protect 
the food production areas, including livestock production and agricultural production. 
One of the chief methods of determent against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union 
was to ensure that normal life in the United States would continue with little delay 





While the population could survive for a time on canned and stored goods, it was vital 
that America’s farmers return to food and animal production as soon as possible. The 
preparation efforts of the government to ensure the agricultural population and their 
livestock and land would survive reflected that concern. A careful reading of the 
materials shows that one of the biggest concerns was the protection of dairy cows. Dairy 
cows were the focus of much attention for two reasons. First, the daily requirement of 
infants and children for dairy milk had no viable substitute at the time. If the milk supply 
was insufficient to meet the needs of the younger population, the effects would be felt for 
their entire lifetime. Second, dairy milk was extremely susceptible to the effects of 
absorbed radiation. Much of the material given to rural and agricultural populations 
featured information about protecting dairy cows, placing their importance above all 
other livestock species on the farm. 
The fallout shelters for rural residents were very different than those of the urban 
and suburban population. Many farm families, especially those in the Great Plains region, 
already had storm shelters. These storm shelters might be in the basement of the house or 
a separate root cellar dug into the ground equally distant from the house and the garden. 
Regardless of where these shelters were physically located, they could expect to be 
pressed into service as fallout shelters in the event of a nuclear attack. These shelters 
already housed the excess garden produce canned by rural families and so it was an easier 
feat to set them up with furniture and enough shelf stable food as recommended by civil 
defense pamphlets. 
The government utilized several avenues, including local agricultural extension 





agricultural use. Although the plans featured farm buildings with built in fallout shelters, 
they were specifically designed to be used daily for their primary agricultural purposes. 
These buildings offered a few advantages over a fallout shelter in a root cellar or 
basement. First, they were an extra farm building to be used daily as needed by the 
farmer. Next with respect to the cattle bunker, the family and any staff would shelter with 
their livestock. They would not need to risk their health or wellbeing to take care of their 
stock; all were housed under one roof. 
One of these plans was for a fallout shelter built on to a potato storage facility.1 
For everyday use the storage facility held six thousand cwt. The term cwt equals one 
hundred pounds, therefore six thousand cwt of potatoes is the equivalent of six hundred 
thousand pounds of potatoes. The plans advised that this would normally be used to hold 
seed potatoes. However, in the event of an emergency anyone sheltering in the adjacent 
facility had access to six hundred thousand pounds of potatoes in addition to other shelter 
goods. The potato storage facility featured two levels, with parking for trucks on both 
levels, and the shelter on the lower level built into the hill. In fact, the protection factor of 
the shelter increased if there was a truck parked above the shelter. Intended to protect up 
to six people following an attack, the shelter measured approximately ten feet by eighteen 
feet.2 
Another of these plans was for a bunker style shelter designed primarily for cattle, 
but easily converted to any type of livestock.3 In addition, the plans say that it may be 
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converted to a rural community shelter for people with some modifications. This shelter 
is designed to be built into a sloping hill in the pastures or fields where the animals are 
grazing. That way the animals can be herded into the safety of the bunker with little 
advance notice of a nuclear attack. The food and water should be pre-positioned, just like 
in your family’s shelter. Depending on the width and length of the chosen shelter design, 
up to sixty cattle could be safely housed for up to two weeks, as recommended by the 
United States Department of Agriculture.4 
Roberts Dairy Company, a major regional dairy company in Elkhorn, Nebraska, 
built and tested a modified version of the bunker style cattle shelter. In 1963 they sent 
thirty-five cows, a bull named Aristocrat, and two student workers underground for two 
weeks to test the viability of their shelter. Built under a company farm, the shelter was 
large enough to house two hundred cows, two bulls, and fifteen people to care for them. 
Separate from the cow shelter, the human shelter had its own air filtration system. The 
cows and bull weathered the two week test with little difficulty. The same cannot be said 
of the student workers. Even though they had a two-way radio so they were not isolated 
completely from the outside world and they had the chores associated with caring for the 
livestock to occupy them, the two young men “complained about boredom and the 
monotonous food.”5 Overall the experiment was deemed a success and proved a positive 
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step in protecting the food chain in the event of a nuclear attack.6 This is particularly 
important because dairy cows are the most vulnerable to contamination from nuclear 
fallout and the most likely to transfer the fallout to the milk they produce.7 
The information provided to the agricultural producers took many forms. One of 
these was Farmer’s Bulletin No. 2107 distributed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
“Defense Against Radioactive Fallout on the Farm.” This bulletin reiterates the steps that 
farmers and livestock producers should take to protect their products. Again, the 
emphasis is on protecting dairy cows if a choice needs to be made, due to the 
susceptibility of milk to radioactive contamination.  Some of the information seems 
contradictory. At one point the bulletin has the following line, “growing vegetables that 
are exposed to heavy fallout may become highly radioactive.”8 However, a few lines 
further into the paragraph the following line advises farmers that they may be able to save 
their radioactive crops, “Most vegetables would be marketable, and should not be 
destroyed without testing for radioactivity.”9 
Another pamphlet provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture had an 
additional bonus, a thirty second Public Service Announcement (PSA). “Your Livestock 
Can Survive Fallout from Nuclear Attack” came as an eight page pamphlet and a PSA to 
demonstrate the instructions found within its pages. The solemn voice narrating the 
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commercial advises viewers that, “In any disaster your livestock need protection too.”10 
At another point in the commercial the same announcer tells farmers, “In an emergency 
shelter your livestock, then take shelter yourself.”11 The farmer demonstrated the various 
techniques intoned by the announcer, including stacking hay bales along the exterior 
walls of the barn to increase the protection factor from radiation and herding a cow into 
the barn to protect it from fallout. In contrast to the commercial, the pamphlet listed 
information on protecting chickens as well as the typical cows, the many ways to ensure 
that adequate amounts of food and water were covered and protected from nuclear 
fallout, and ways to convert typical farm buildings and storage facilities into improvised 
shelters at the last minute to ensure that the maximum number of animals were protected 
as well as possible. Included in the pamphlet was a set of specific instructions on what to 
do “[i]f you receive sufficient fallout warning…” and “[i]f fallout warning gives you little 
time…”12 The pamphlet does have some advice on protecting the family on the last page 
of the brochure. Unlike the video version, the pamphlet urges that readers, “first provide 
for your own safety and that of your family and neighbors. To do this, you may not be 
able, at first, to take care of your livestock, your crops, and your land.”13 
In June of 1963 the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
Office of Education produced a more formal basic Civil Defense educational program 
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also aimed at rural residents. Officially the program was commissioned by the Federal 
Extension Service and the United States Department of Agriculture, in cooperation with 
the OCD. This program was designed for use by extension office agents to uniformly 
instruct their local constituents in the basics of civil defense as it applied to their unique 
environments. Covered in the program were the basics of nuclear attack, why rural 
preparedness was necessary, the importance of a shelter and how to stock it, helping the 
community, preparing to care for your livestock, feed, and crops, rural fire prevention, 
and making a family survival plan. This educational effort plainly stated one of the 
federal government’s main goals for producing so much Civil Defense material 
specifically aimed at the rural population. Under the heading of “Why Rural 
Preparedness” the following statement appeared, “Following any attack it would be 
essential that farmers and other rural people survive, save breeding stock, decontaminate 
and continue basic food production that would be vital to the country’s survival and 
recovery.”14  That is the clear motivating factor behind the ongoing effort to convince the 
rural population that they need to prepare to survive the dangers of nuclear fallout. No 
giving up! Your country needed you and, more importantly, what you produced, to get 
back up and running smoothly. The rest of the information included was similar to many 
of the other brochures and pamphlets. Advice on building a safe shelter, or making a 
facility that you currently have, safer from radioactive fallout, what to stock in your 
shelter, and how to protect your livestock. This particular instructional effort did include 
a new piece of information regarding protecting livestock. In addition to the usual 
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entreaty to ensure that dairy cows received the most protected spots in the livestock 
shelter, breeding stock should have the next best areas in the shelter. The protection of 
good breeding stock was secondary only to the protection of dairy cows. A farmer’s 
breeding stock was as important to his future as the land itself. Without breeding stock to 
continue a robust and healthy herd or flock a farmer would have a bleak future. The herd 
or flock would die out or worse, face inbreeding problems, and the farmer would have 
survived the attacks only to lose the sustainability and value of his herd or flock. Any 
leftover space should go to the rest of the animals.15 
This was also one of the few Civil Defense produced items that discussed a very 
important subject, fire prevention. In the event of a nuclear attack many populations were 
potentially going to be isolated. The government did not want to acknowledge that fact, 
but they came close in this section. If the government openly acknowledged that in the 
event of a nuclear attack, populations may be on their own without governmental help, it 
would acknowledge that the government was not in total control of the country’s 
immediate reaction to a nuclear attack. The United States’ government had thus far built 
themselves up to be the sole expert on all things nuclear. All information flowed from the 
government or its agents. The most important idea that the government sought to convey 
was that through early preparation the people of the United States and their government 
could survive a nuclear attack. If the government could not maintain control after an 
attack, chaos could reign. This section listed various steps that rural residents could take 
to help prevent fires. Among the suggestions listed were removing fire hazards from 
around and inside buildings, having tools like fire extinguishers, shovels, and water on 
                                                          
 





hand at all times, and providing a large body of water on the farm earmarked for fighting 
fires. In addition, neighbors should form their own firefighting teams to ensure that they 
could handle emergencies on their own. This is as close as the government comes to 
acknowledging that local services probably will not be available and people might be on 
their own for some time when it comes to facing life after a nuclear attack.16 
Protecting fertile and productive cropland was another issue that the federal 
government thought important to the continued survival of the population of the United 
States. As with the dairy milk, the growth of fresh food would prove important to the 
long term survival of the United States. The extent to which the nuclear fallout 
contaminated farmland in the agricultural areas was of grave concern to the federal 
government. There were items produced for farmers that addressed this issue. The United 
States Department of Agriculture addressed these concerns by producing a 
comprehensive report and a pamphlet that offered a greatly abridged version of the 
information contained in the report. Both addressed soil, crops, and how fallout would 
affect them. Both agreed that in areas with light fallout, farming would hardly be 
affected. However, if an area experienced early and heavy fallout, agricultural production 
could face challenges for years to come. The eight page pamphlet does not do justice to 
the subject matter covered in the full report. One interesting note though, there is a 
disclaimer in bold print on the second page of the pamphlet that reads, “This publication 
discusses radioactive-contamination conditions that may occur as a result of heavy fallout 
                                                          
 





from massive attack. The information given here is not related in any way to conditions 
that result from distant, controlled testing of nuclear devices.”17 
An expansive report from the Agricultural Research Service, produced in 1962, 
included very detailed information for agricultural producers about virtually everything 
that one would need to plan for a nuclear attack or determine when it was safe to come 
out following one. The first section provides the details of a potential nuclear attack. 
Included are the area of destruction, fallout formation, area of severe fallout, gamma and 
beta radiation, hazards of various types of radiation, and a very detailed account of how 
to figure out the intensity of radiation in your area and its time of decay. The latter also 
features a table listing the variable involved to help illustrate the method. The next 
section explains the amount of protection provided from various types of shelters, again 
complete with pictorial examples. Another section addresses the unique situation of farm 
families, and the need to care for livestock. They are faced with the conflicting desires to 
protect themselves and their livestock at the same time. While urban and suburban shelter 
dwellers would not face this dilemma, every farm family would inevitably need to 
balance the health and safety of their family with that of their livestock. By extension, 
this decision will have ramification long after they emerge from the shelter. If they 
emerge too early to protect their livestock they risk their lives. If they do not protect their 
stock and land sufficiently, they will not have anything to emerge to. As the report states, 
“Even during an early period following fallout, farm families will be faced with the 
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necessity of doing such farm chores as caring for livestock.”18 Further down the page is a 
table that breaks down how long after a nuclear explosion a person could work outside 
per day without getting a deadly dose of radiation.19 For example, in the second twenty-
four hours after a nuclear explosion a person could only work outside their shelter for one 
hour. Compare that to the fifteenth through the twenty-first days when a person could 
work outside their shelter for up to four hours per day without getting too much exposure 
to radiation.20 
The section specifically mentioning livestock furnished much more detailed 
information about  protection for animals, their food and water. In addition to the usual 
stuff about dairy cows, there was information on how to protect animals that are unable to 
be sheltered in buildings. The pamphlet states that “[a]nimals that are not placed in a barn 
or under a roof might, if possible, be placed under trees or where they are covered to 
some extent. It is better to keep animals alive on contaminated feed and water than to let 
them die from starvation.”21 If a farmer is unable to protect his animals from fallout the 
report offers the following advice for cows, “If practical, they should be thoroughly 
washed off as soon as it is possible for the farmer to stay outside for a limited time.”22 In 
addition, scientists conducted a study to determine the amount of exposure that specific 
types of shelter would provide to the various domestic farm animals. The most effective 
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type of shelter would be the basement-type barn with a loft full of hay and the least 
effective type of shelter would be a tight wooden barn. If no shelter were provided for 
animals cattle, hogs, and sheep suffer approximately the same number of deaths based on 
exposure to roentgens. They suffered thirty percent death rate at five hundred roentgens, 
one hundred percent death at both one thousand and three thousand roentgens. However, 
chickens were the exception with ten percent death rate at five hundred roentgens, sixty 
four percent at one thousand, and one hundred percent death at three thousand 
roentgens.2324 
This page also included a mortality chart that listed various domestic farm 
animals and how long they would survive if left exposed to different doses of radiation. 
This chart allowed farmers to decide how likely their animals were to die given the 
duration and amount of radiation their area was expected to experience. It is interesting to 
note that poultry apparently tolerate radiation exposure better than most other domestic 
animals. Their midlethal dose of radiation, the radiation dose that you would expect half 
of your animals to die within thirty days, is nine hundred roentgens; while cattle have a 
midlethal dose of five hundred fifty roentgens. 25 The report continues with more on 
poultry, including that since most poultry have shelter to protect the flock from predators 
and the environment, poultry stands a better chance than most other farm raised livestock 
of being protected from radioactive fallout. In addition, since chickens eat a commercial 
feed product, their food would be safe from contamination due to being stored in large 
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bags inside the barn. The result is that following a nuclear attack poultry would be the 
least likely contaminated meat source available for the surviving population.26 
One of the most interesting and unique sections of this report covered the dangers 
of internal radiation poisoning. The key way to get internal radiation is from eating or 
drinking a contaminated item. Initially the process would be straight forward; a person 
would eat fruit, vegetables, or grains that had particles of fallout on it. Eventually though, 
the radioactive fallout that contaminated the soil would be absorbed into the plants. Then 
animals and the contaminated animals eaten by humans either ingested the plants or 
humans would eat the contaminated plants directly. In both cases radiation entered the 
food chain, causing illness and probable death at every stage. This is crucial information 
to disseminate to the general public so that they do not ingest contaminated food or water. 
The danger would be masses of people surviving the initial attack only to disregard the 
dangers of fallout contamination and dying after the attack from internal radiation 
poisoning. 
There is a detailed section on radioactive iodine and radioactive strontium. These 
two isotopes were critical because they were the most common isotopes to contaminate 
fresh milk. Due to the importance of milk and milk products for the nutritional health of 
babies and children and the quantities required to satisfy that demand, scientists had 
extensively studied milk’s radioactivity and the half-life of that radioactivity.  The 
extreme risk of radiation entering the fresh milk supply of the United States was why 
there was such an emphasis in the literature.The emphasis in the literature was due to the 
fact that the government wanted to ensure that the importance of the shelter and 
                                                          
 





protection of dairy cows and their food and water supplies was understood by the rural 
population. Secondary to the dairy cows, the safekeeping strong breeding stock was the 
next priority. To this end, the danger of strontium ninety and the difference between it 
and strontium eighty-nine was discussed in some of the literature. Strontium ninety was a 
radiation with a half-life of twenty-eight years. In other words, it lost half of its potency 
every twenty-eight years. This is in contrast to strontium eighty-nine which has a half-life 
of only fifty-three days. This meant that every fifty-three days the strontium eighty-nine 
lost one half of its potency. Both of these chemicals are important to fresh milk 
production because the chemical in the soil behaves much like calcium and is absorbed 
through the plant via the animal eating it. In addition, the strontium is secreted in milk 
and collects or is stored in bones. Tests revealed that children are sensitive to the 
radioactivity present in strontium. Since children drink a larger proportion of milk than 
adults and are more sensitive to the strontium, it is crucial that all effort is made to 
prevent it from entering the milk supply in the first place. The result of children with 
exposure to high doses of radioactive milk is an increased rate of bone cancer.27 
Another section that introduced new information into the discussion concerned 
the croplands that formed the foundation of so many agricultural families’ homesteads. 
This section included use of the contaminated land and a table for determining that use by 
strontium ninety levels, calcium levels, and type of crop. If one’s cropland had low levels 
of calcium pre-fallout, then the land was less likely to retain strontium ninety, and pass it 
on to foods grown on that land through the root system of the plants. Another 
consideration was the calcium level of the plants;  potatoes and corn had lower levels of 
                                                          






calcium and would absorb less strontium ninety than leafy green vegetables which are 
higher in calcium. Contaminated irrigation water would not appreciably add to strontium 
levels. Most of the strontium would be diluted by the water, with a large portion of the 
remaining being absorbed by the earthen banks and sides of the water source.28 
The reclamation of contaminated croplands and grazing fields could take years. 
The methods to decontaminate valuable agricultural lands varied from removing the 
ground cover and crops to removal of the entire topsoil layer. The effectiveness and cost 
of the latter method makes it questionable for large scale reclamation projects. For areas 
on a grander scale, the method of deep plowing seemed more practical, if not as 
comprehensive. The deep plowing method aimed to turn the contaminated topsoil as 
much as eighteen inches under the surface. This would be deep enough to allow most 
crops to be grown without fear of the root systems reaching the contamination. There 
were a couple of major problems with the deep plowing method. First, the idea that one 
could plow under all of the topsoil without it mixing with the soil it was pulling up to 
replace it was not credible. Second, the soil that replaced the once fertile topsoil would 
not necessarily be as productive. 29 
The appendices contribute to the usefulness of this report. While not technically 
part of the appendices, the glossary is placed between the last page of the report and the 
first appendix. However, the three page glossary is extremely thorough. It is a short 
primer on all things nuclear, not only the common terms like “contamination” and 
“shelter,” but the more obscure terms like “curie” and “equivalent residual dose.” 
Appendix A explains how to measure fallout radiation. Included are good pictures of a 
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dosimeter, a machine that tracks an individual’s radiation exposure, and a Geiger counter, 
a machine that detects and measures radioactivity in a specific area. Appendix B lists 
various building types and their protection factors. Appendix C features several different 
fallout shelters appropriate for agricultural use. Included in this appendix are two 
different designs that combine shelters for both the animals and the people that must care 
for them. These designs are similar in nature to the potato storage shelter and cattle 
shelter previously mentioned released by the United States Department of Agriculture. 
One design is a forty cow dairy barn with built in family shelter and feed storage. This 
design was intended to be used as a barn and milking facility during normal times and as 
a shelter following a nuclear attack. 30 The dual purpose made it a better investment than 
a designated use shelter only. 
This report is a concise, complete compendium of information for farmers and 
other agricultural producers. If the information is studied and used to prepare the 
homestead for possible nuclear attack, the chances of survival would greatly increase for 
rural families and their livestock. The only other thing that would need to be added was a 
listing of the recommended types and amounts of items to store in one’s shelter. 
Considering those lists were available at the same extension agent that distributed this 
report, farmers likely received both. 
The tone of all the information aimed at rural populations emphasized 
preparedness and self-sufficiency. More than any other population in the United States, 
the rural and agricultural population had a high probability of being isolated following a 
nuclear attack. Rather than wait for the government to help them or provide them with 
                                                          
 





shelter, the information aimed at this population stressed taking care of themselves and 
their responsibilities. 
The information provided by the government provided agricultural producers with 
scientific information that was designed to help them prioritize their preparation and 
survival efforts. The first line of recommendations was shelters large enough for prized 
stock and their family under one roof readied ahead of any disaster. If that advice was not 
followed, then they offered suggestions for preparing last minute shelters. One of the 
most important things that the government provided though was undiluted information. 
 More than any other population, the government treated this population as a 
partner in the massive effort of getting the country up and running again. As such, the 
government needed their help to continue to provide a valuable service and product even 
after the attack. To do this, the farmers and agricultural producers needed to have the 
information to make the best decisions. This included the reiteration of the need to 
protect the dairy cows, first and foremost. This was of paramount importance to the 
government, so that information was up front and central in all the information provided 
to rural populations. The protection of the food production mechanism was vitally 
important to the continuity of the United States following a nuclear attack. Without fresh 
food coming from farms and ranches, any population that managed to survive a nuclear 






AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO PREPARATION 
 
There were many similarities in the preparations that the federal government 
published for the various target audiences. After all there were some commonalities 
between the urban, suburban, and rural populations. All demographics were urged to 
prepare shelters in advance of any possible attacks, this included stocking them with 
adequate supplies. Children’s introduction to the possibility of nuclear attack and what to 
do in case of one was a nationwide effort. 
Fallout shelters were a previously unknown reality that all Americans became 
familiar with. Whether they actually built them or just studied the plans, people could not 
help but be aware of them. In 1961, following President Kennedy’s speech in July and 
letter in the September 15th edition of LIFE magazine urging the American people to 
prepare, there were twenty two million copies of Family Fallout Shelter distributed.1 This 
is equivalent to approximately twelve percent of the total population of the United States 
in 1960.2 That does not account for the millions who planned their shelters on their own, 
through plans in their copy of LIFE, or through their extension agent. 
Another commonality across demographics was the directive to stock up on food, 
water, and other supplies so that one could stay sheltered for at least two weeks following 
a nuclear attack. There were many different types of lists distributed. One of the most 
popular was the “Grandma’s Pantry” list. Printed on paper shaped to resemble a black 
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soup pot, these lists and the accompanying matching displays were an attempt to link the 
current efforts with the previous generations’ overall preparedness. The government even 
produced a freestanding display that invoked images of elderly women putting home 
canned goods on shelves to help feed their families and stave off hunger.3 
The educational effort aimed toward children was another commonality of all 
localities. Bert the Turtle was universally marketed to children. The coloring book and 
cartoon starring the character provide further evidence of this marketing. In addition, 
large school systems provided their students with dog tags for easier identification of the 
bodies. In some rural areas the schools themselves were fallout shelters. Built entirely 
underground, the elementary school in Artesia, New Mexico doubled as a community 
fallout shelter. The cafeteria featured a sign that read, “Normal Conditions: Food Storage. 
Fallout Conditions: Morgue.”4 This was in addition to some schools actually using the 
FCDA’s Survival under Atomic Attack as text for fourth grade students.5 
There were many ways in which the preparations for the various demographic 
groups differed. The most obvious was during the Eisenhower administration’s push for 
mass evacuations. While the urban and some of the suburban populace was being 
prepared to evacuate their homes due to their proximity to Target Areas, the rest of the 
suburban and all of the rural populace was being prepared to host all the refugees. In 
general, the more rural a location, the less likely the area was to be targeted. This 
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changed in the mid to late 1960s with the placement of the Minuteman missiles in many 
rural locations. However, for the scope of this study the Target Areas were largely in 
heavily populated metropolitan areas or those areas with strategically located military 
bases. 
Another major difference in the preparations that was unique to the rural 
population was the need to protect livestock, feed, and other agricultural resources. In 
addition, rural populations were facing the possibility of being isolated from outside help 
for at least a short period of time. Several of the government provided preparation 
materials stressed the ability to take care of themselves or band with neighbors to help 
each other out. 
Due to the unique qualifications and needs of the rural and agricultural 
communities, the information provided to them was different than that given to the 
general public. The United States Department of Agriculture provided technical and 
scientific information directly related to the protection of livestock, crops, and land so 
that the rural and agricultural communities would be equipped to survive a nuclear attack. 
Their survival was crucial to the rebuilding of the United States following an attack. 
Survivors needed to have healthy and safe food to eat when they emerged from the 
shelters.  
Rural families needed to protect their valuable resources for several reasons. First 
and foremost because they were possible sources of food and other sustenance for the 
family following a nuclear attack. While many families living in rural areas were 
accustomed to stocking up on food items and other supplies due to their isolated 





This meant that they needed to consider their livestock and crops as potential sources of 
food to keep themselves and their neighbors alive until life returned to normal. 
Another reason was the government’s grave concern about protecting the food 
production system so that the United States could get up and running as soon as possible 
after an attack. Provided the nuclear attack did not significantly impact the producer’s 
local area, they would be tasked with keeping food production output functioning at as 
close to pre-attack levels as possible. The government was counting on rural populations 
to help them return the country to normal operating conditions as quickly as possible to 
reinforce the legitimate United States government. 
Finally, the resources represented financial assets that the family owned and 
needed to protect. Many families that own agricultural land have done so for generations 
and consider it a family legacy. These families pass the land and business down to their 
children and grandchildren. To survive the nuclear attack, yet lose their entire herd or 
have all their land be contaminated for decades by nuclear fallout would be catastrophic 
for them not only on a business level, but a personal one as well. The bloodlines of their 
stock needed to be carefully protected to ensure their family’s heritage would be 
protected. They would have the added bonus of being able to offer their breeding stock to 






The history of Civil Defense took many turns between Presidents Roosevelt and 
Kennedy. Each President determined how he wanted to steer the direction of Civil 
Defense preparedness while in office. Roosevelt appointed his wife Eleanor as one of the 
advisors and felt strongly in the idea of Civil Defense preparedness for the American 
people. The buildup of the German war machine and the advent of World War II 
convinced the American people of the appropriateness of those actions. However, with 
his death in 1945, President Truman took over. Truman believed that with the end of 
World War II Civil Defense preparedness had outlived its usefulness. Truman had been 
complacent in the idea that the United States was the only country with an atomic 
weapon. Following the successful detonation of the Soviet Union’s first atomic weapon 
in 1949, Truman changed his mind. With Eisenhower’s election the focus shifted from 
preparing shelters, to mass evacuations for the first time. In large part due to the 
Eisenhower administration’s mandate to significantly improve the interstate highway 
system. The administration did not want to divert any money from its primary mission of 
expanding and improving the highway system, so they found a way to incorporate the 
highway system into Civil Defense. Despite many experts advising that mass evacuations 
were grossly improbable, the Eisenhower administration stuck to its guns. The focus 
shifted again with President Kennedy’s election. Kennedy’s tenure in office featured 
heightened tensions with the Soviet Union over a number of issues including the Berlin 
Wall and Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy made a number of personal appeals 
to the American people, urging them to prepare themselves for nuclear war. This is 





Urban and suburban populations shared many of the same preparations. Although 
urban populations had access to more public shelters, public shelters were found in all 
sectors of American life. The focus of suburban preparations was generally the home 
shelter, either in the basement or the backyard. The government offered home equity and 
improvement loans to facilitate the building of these home shelters. Introduced in the late 
1950s, mass evacuation plans were a complete one hundred and eighty degree change in 
preparations. People needed to have their supplies ready to go on a moment’s notice and 
to know which sector they lived and worked in and the corresponding evacuation routes. 
Rural populations had a much more complicated time when preparing for survival. The 
population in agricultural regions had not only themselves and their families to think of 
but hundreds, if not thousands of heads of livestock to protect as well. Realistically they 
knew that it would be impossible to protect all the livestock they had. However, 
preparations needed to be made to protect as many important producers as possible. After 
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